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CONFESSION OF JUDGMENT-PENNSYLVANIA
CONFESSION OF JUDGMENT PROCEDURE
DECLARED UNCONSTITUTIONAL
Swarb v. Lennox, 314 F. Supp. 1091 (E.D. Pa. 1970)
In Swarb v. Lennox,' the United States District Court for the
Eastern District of Pennsylvania held the Pennsylvania practice of
confessing judgment 2 unconstitutional as applied to individual nat-
ural residents of Pennsylvania having incomes of less than $10,000.
1. 314 F. Supp. 1091 (E.D. Pa. 1970).
2. Confession of judgment is authorized in Pennsylvania by the fol-
lowing statutes and rules:
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 1482 (1962) provides:
The prothonotaries and clerks aforesaid shall have and exercise
respectively, in the courts to which they severally belong, and with
full effect in term time and vacation, the powers and authorities
following, to wit: They shall have power
III. To enter judgments at the instance of plaintiffs, upon the
confession of defendants.
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 739 (1962), as amended, (Supp. 1970).
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 738 (1962), as amended, (Supp. 1970):
It shall be the duty of the prothonotaries, respectively, on the
application of any persons willing to become parties in an amica-
ble suit, to enter the same without the agency of an attorney, and
when thereunto required, and on confession in writing, executed in
presence of two or more witnesses, expressing the amount due to
the plaintiff (which confession shall be filed in his office), he shall
enter judgment against the defendant, for the amount expressed as
aforesaid, with stay of execution as may be agreed upon by the
parties and the prothonotary shall receive fifty cents, for every
such entry, to be paid by the defendant in the suit, and when any
suit is ended, the clerk of the court before which it was pending,
shall on the request of the plaintiff expressed in writing, enter
satisfaction thereon.
PA. R. Civ. P. 2950-76.
The decision applies only to confession of judgment clauses in leases
and consumer financing documents; it does not apply to bonds and
warrants of attorney accompanying mortgages and notes accom-
panying mortgages required by governmental agencies.'
The Act of February 24, 1806, provides:
It shall be the duty of the prothonotary of any court of
record, within this Commonwealth, on the application of
any person being the original holder (or assignee of such
holder) of a note, bond, or other instrument of writing, in
which judgment is confessed, or containing a warrant for
an attorney at law, or other person to confess judgment,
to enter judgment against the person or persons, who exe-
cuted the same for the amount, which, from the face of the
instrument, may appear to be due, without the agency of an
attorney, or declaration filed, with such stay of execution
as may be therein mentioned, for the fee of one dollar, to be
paid by the defendant; particularly entering on his docket
the date and tenor of the instrument of writing, on which
the judgment may be founded, which shall have the same
force and effect, as if a declaration had been filed, and judg-
ment confessed by an attorney, or judgment obtained in
open court, and in term time; and the defendant shall not
be compelled to pay any costs, or fee to the plaintiff's attor-
ney, when judgment is entered on any instrument of writ-
ing as aforesaid.4
Pursuant to this section and the confession of judgment clause'
in a contract, a defendant-debtor consented to waive his right to
notice and hearing before entry of the judgment. One hundred
fifty-four years after the passage of the Act, the District Court held
the procedure complies with the due process of law clause of the
fourteenth amendment6 only if there has been an understanding,
3. Swarb v. Lennox, 314 F. Supp. 1091, 1102-03 (E.D. Pa. 1970).
4. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 739 (1962), as amended, (Supp. 1970).
5. In Swarb the clause read:
A. Each buyer and co-buyer, jointly and severally, hereby
authorize and empower the Prothonotary, clerk or any attorney,
or any court of record within the United States, or elsewhere, at
any time, to appear for each buyer and a co-buyer and to confess
judgment as often as necessary against each buyer and of co-
buyer and in favor of the holder, as of any term with or without
declaration filed for such sum or sums as may be payable here-
under with the cost of suit with 20 per cent added as attorney's
fees. With respect to any judgment and exemption under any law
now or hereafter in force, and each hereby agrees that real estate
may be sold under a writ or execution and voluntarily condemns
the same and authorize the Prothonotary or Clerk to enter said
condemnation on such writ; and each buyer and co-buyer agrees
that a true copy hereof, verified by affidavit made by the holder or
someone acting on its behalf, may be filed in such proceeding in
lieu of filing the original as warrant of attorney, any rule of court,
custom to practice to the contrary notwithstanding. Any judg-
ment entered hereon or of any prior note for which the note is in
whole or in part mediately or immediately renewal shall be se-
cured, security for the payment hereof and of any future note
which is in whole or in part mediately or immediately renewal
hereof.
Swarb v. Lennox, 314 F. Supp. 1091, 1097 n.14 (E.D. Pa. 1970).
6. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge
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voluntary consent to the waiver in signing the document authoriz-
ing a confession of judgment.'
CONFESSION OF JUDGMENT CLAUSE
Confession of judgment is a consensual, voluntary submission
without service of process to a court's jurisdiction." A New York
court in 1868 explained:
Confession of judgment is the voluntary submission to the
jurisdiction of the court, giving by consent, and without
the service of process, what could otherwise only be ob-
tained by summons and complaint and through formal pro-
ceedings. A person who confesses judgment submits to be
sued in that form and manner. The confession of a judg-
ment is but one of the ways and processes, one manner by
which a person is sued.
Because the confession of judgment clause in a contract allows a
creditor to enter judgment against his debtor without the debtor's
knowledge, it has come under increasing criticism in recent years.10
Courts have strictly construed the authorization given by it;"I at the
same time, they have been liberal in opening the judgment on a
showing by the debtor that he has a substantive defense. 12
The judgment entered by the prothonotary pursuant to section
the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor
shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV, § 1.
7. Swarb v. Lennox, 314 F. Supp. 1091, 1095 (E.D. Pa. 1970).
8. Horner Sales Corp. v. Motor Sport, 377 Pa. 392, 105 A.2d 285
(1954); Commonwealth ex rel. Bradford County v. Lynch, 146 Pa. Super.
469, 23 A.2d 77 (1941).
9. First National Bank v. Garlinghouse, 53 Barb. 615, 619 (N.Y.
1868).
10. Hopson, Cognovit Judgments: An Ignored Problem of Due Process
and Full Faith and Credit, 29 U. CHi. L. REv. 111 (1961); Leary, Random
Reflections on Remedies and Collections in the Consumer Credit Field, 19
AM. U.L. REv. 189 (1970); Note, Confession of Judgment, 102 U. PA. L. REV.
524 (1954); Note, Resort to the Legal Process in Collecting Debts from High
Risk Credit Buyers in Los Angeles-Alternative Methods for Allocating
Present Costs, 14 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 879 (1967).
11. Elizabeth Lodge No. 596 v. Ellis, 391 Pa. 19, 137 A.2d 286 (1958);
Grady v. Schiffer, 384 Pa. 302, 121 A.2d 71 (1956) ; Cutler Corp. v. Latshaw,
374 Pa. 1, 97 A.2d 234 (1953); Salazo v. Boyle, 365 Pa. 586, 76 A.2d 179
(1950).
12. See R. & R. Trucking Co. v. Lewis Steel Products Corp., 424
Pa. 34, 225 A.2d 687 (1967); Nadolny v. Scoratow, 412 Pa. 488, 195 A.2d 87
(1963); L. & N. Sales Co. v. Stuski, 188 Pa. Super. 117, 146 A.2d 154
(1958).
73913 has the same legal effect as a judgment entered by a jury.14
After judgment has been entered, the debtor can seek relief in two
ways: by petition to strike the judgment and by petition to open
the judgment. 15 The petition to strike the judgment may be used
only where irregularities appear on the face of the record.16 Where
the debtor has a meritorious defense against his creditor's action,
he must petition to open the judgment.' 7 As noted in the Swarb
opinion, the petition to open the judgment casts upon the debtor
the burden of proving his need for equitable relief."8 This is con-
trary to the normal creditor-debtor cases in which the plaintiff-
creditor has the burden of proving his claim on the debt before
the defendant-debtor must enter his defense; in the petition to open,
the debtor is the claimant.'-9
Heretofore, the courts have sought to give the debtor some re-
lief by strictly construing the confession of judgment clause. Ac-
cording to the statute, judgment may be entered by the prothono-
tary only if the amount due appears on the face of the instrument or
when it can be calculated from information on the face of the in-
strument. 20 In Lenson v. Klovsky" the court held that where the
lease clause provided that upon default the lessor would be en-
titled to damages equal to the amount of rent reserved for the bal-
ance of the term less the fair rental value for the remainder of the
term, the prothonotary could not enter judgment since the lease
did not indicate what the fair rental value would be.
Another generally accepted rule is that the authorization to con-
fess judgment must be clear, explicit, in writing and signed by the
person against whom it is asserted. 22 In Cutler Corp. v. Latshaw
23
13. PA. STAT. AINN. tit. 12, § 739 (1962), as amended, (Supp. 1970).
14. Id. See O'Hara v. Manley, 140 Pa. Super. 39, 12 A.2d 820 (1940);
Helvete v. Rapp, 7 S. & R. 306 (1821).
15. See DeRose v. Lombardi, 413 Pa. 258, 196 A.2d 336 (1964);
Kros v. Bacall Textile Corp., 386 Pa. 360, 126 A.2d 421 (1956).
16. See Prestressed Structure, Inc. v. Bargain City, U.S.A., 413 Pa. 262,
196 A.2d 338 (1964); Century Credit Co. v. Jones, 196 Pa. Super. 210,
173 A.2d 768 (1963); Gingrich v. Clarke, 12 Leb. 189 (Pa. C.P. 1968).
17. Northway Village No. 3, Inc. v. Northway Properties, Inc., 430
Pa. 499, 244 A.2d 47 (1968); Prestressed Structure, Inc. v. Bargain City,
U.S.A., 413 Pa. 262, 196 A.2d 338 (1964); Produce Factors Corp. v. Brown,
197 Pa. Super. 626, 179 A.2d 919 (1962); Tornese v. Hassinger, 114 P.L.J. 354
(Pa. C.P. 1966).
18. Swarb v. Lennox, 314 F. Supp. 1091, 1094-95 (E.D. Pa. 1970);
Brunwasser v. Christopher, 192 Pa. Super. 305, 162 A.2d 228 (1960).
19. Comment, Abolition of the Confession of Judgment Note in Re-
tail Installment Sales Contracts in Pennsylvania, 73 DicK. L. REv. 115
(1968).
20. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 739 (1962), as amended, (Supp. 1970);
Smith v. Safeguard Mut. Ins. Co., 212 Pa. Super. 83, 239 A.2d 824 (1968);
Travelers Express Co. v. Segall, 203 Pa. Super. 221, 199 A.2d 531 (1964);
Better Bilt Door Co. v. Oates, 165 Pa. Super. 460, 69 A.2d 192 (1949).
21. 430 Pa. 193, 241 A.2d 66 (1968).
22. Grady v. Schiffer, 384 Pa. 302, 121 A.2d 71 (1956); Frantz Tractor
Co., Inc. v. Wyoming Valley Nursery, 384 Pa. 213, 120 A.2d 303 (1956); Cut-
ler Corp. v. Latshaw, 374 Pa. 1, 97 A.2d 234 (1953).
23. 374 Pa. 1, 97 A.2d 234 (1953).
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and in Frantz Tractor Co., Inc. v. Wyoming Valley Nursery,24 the
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania held that where the confession of
judgment appeared on the reverse side of the contract and the face
side of the agreement made general reference to the terms and
conditions on the reverse side, the debtor did not sign the confession
of judgment clause. In Frantz the court stated that the signature
must bear such relation to the provision authorizing the confession
of judgment as to leave no doubt that the lessee signed, conscious
of the fact he was conferring on the lessor a warrant to confess judg-
ment against him.
2 5
The courts have held that once the creditor has exercised his
power to confess judgment, the power is exhausted even though
the entry was invalid and the judgment stricken.26 Also, the
debtor's waiver of his right to appeal applies only to irregularities
apparent on the face of the record; for example, he could still
appeal if the one confessing judgment lacked authority to do so. 27
These strict construction rules, however, do not adequately pro-
tect the unwary consumer who signs the warrant of attorney to con-
fess judgment against him. Although Rule 295828 now provides for
20 days notice to the debtor before execution, it is doubtful that this
is adequate time for him to secure an attorney and prepare a de-
fense.29 Nor does this provision appear to shift back to the creditor
the burden of proving his claim.
The debtor also may have lost his opportunity to assert his per-
sonal defenses. If the confession of judgment note provides that en-
try be made only after default, the note is negotiable.30 When
the note is renegotiated, usually to a finance company,31 the new
holder many times becomes a holder in due course.3 2 Under the
Uniform Commercial Code, the debtor is left with only his real
24. 384 Pa. 213, 120 A.2d 303 (1956).
25. Id. at 216, 120 A.2d at 305.
26. Scott Factors, Inc. v. Hartley, 425 Pa. 290, 228 A.2d 887 (1967);
American Bowling Club v. Kanefsky, 370 Pa. 136, 87 A.2d 646 (1952);
Harr v. Furman, 346 Pa. 138, 29 A.2d 527 (1943); Mars Nat'l Bank v.
Hughes, 243 Pa. 223, 89 A. 1130 (1914).
27. Grady v. Schiffer, 384 Pa. 302, 121 A.2d 71 (1956); Pittsburgh
Coal Co. v. Potts, 92 Pa. Super. 1 (1927).
28. PA. R. CIv. P. 2958.
29. Swarb v. Lennox, 314 F. Supp. 1091, 1101 (E.D. Pa. 1970).
30. See Smith v. Lenchner, 204 Pa. Super. 500, 205 A.2d 626 (1964);
Fidelity Trust Co. v. Gardiner, 191 Pa. Super. 17, 155 A.2d 405 (1959);
Billings v. Roth, 156 Pa. Super. 390, 10 A.2d 910 (1944).
31. Comment, Abolition of the Confession of Judgment Note in Re-
tail Installment Sales Contracts in Pennsylvania, 73 Dxm. L. REV. 115, 120
(1968).
32. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 3-302 (1962):
1. A holder in due course is a holder who takes the instrument
defenses.8 3 If the relation between the seller and the finance com-
pany is such that the finance company should have further in-
quired into the circumstances of the transaction between seller
and buyer, the courts may deny the finance company holder in due
course status.3 4  Though the buyer is then able to assert his per-
sonal defenses, the protection given him is inadequate since he is
still faced with the fact that judgment has been entered against him
without his knowledge.35 He still carries the burden of proof in his
petition to open the judgment.3 6
The confession of judgment note has been defended as a quick,
cheap method of debt collection.3 7 The creditor does not have to
pay the costs incident to a typical civil suit, nor does he have to
hire an attorney.38 Because of the relative ease of obtaining a
valid judgment against the debtor, it is maintained, the creditor is
more willing to extend credit, particularly to the low income, high-
risk consumer.3 9 The persuasiveness of these arguments is blunted
by the results of one writer's survey of various finance companies
that the industry itself would not object too strenuously to the abo-
(a) for value; and
(b) in good faith; and
(c) without notice that it is overdue or has been dishonored or
of any defense against or claim to it on the part of any
person.
33. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 3-305 (1962):
To the extent that a holder is a holder in due course he takes
the instrument free from
(1) all claims to it on the part of any person; and
(2) all defenses of any party to the instrument with whom the
holder has not dealt except
(a) infancy to the extent that it is a defense to a simple con-
tract; and
(b) such other incapacity, or duress, or illegality of the
transaction, as renders the obligation of the party a nul-
lity; and
(c) such misrepresentation as has induced the party to sign
the instrument with neither knowledge nor reasonable
opportunity to obtain knowledge of its character or its
essential terms; and
(d) discharge in insolvency proceedings; and
(e) any other discharge of which the holder has notice when
he take the instrument.
34. Norman v. World Wide Distributors, Inc., 202 Pa. Super. 53, 195
A.2d 115 (1963).
35. See Comment, Abolition of the Confession of Judgment Note in
Retail Installment Sales Contracts in Pennsylvania, 73 DICK. L. REV. 115,
118 (1968).
36. The harshness of the result may be caused by the holder in due
course doctrine rather than the cognovit procedure. Note, Consumer Pro-
tection-Truth in Lending and the Cognovit Judgment, 1970 Wisc. L. REV.
216 (1970).
37. Comment, Translating Sympathy for Deceived Consumers into
Effective Programs for Protection, 114 U. PA. L. REv. 395, 418-19 (1966);
Hopson, Cognovit Judgments: An Ignored Problem of Due Process and
Full Faith and Credit, 29 U. Cm. L. REV. 111, 121 (1961).
38. Comment, Translating Sympathy for Deceived Consumers into Ef-
fective Programs for Protection, 114 U. PA. L. REV. 395, 418-19 (1966).
39. See Note, Resort to the Legal Process in Collecting Debts from
High Risk Credit Buyers in Los Angeles-Alternative Methods for Allo-
cating Present Costs, 14 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 879 (1967).
Recent Case
DICKINSON LAW REVIEW
lition of confession of judgment: "Although the economic policy
of the country favors credit buying, judgments without notice and
opportunity to defend are not vital to that policy.
' 40
Finally, this method of collection, while cheapest to the credi-
tor, may prove to be expensive for the debtor. This is pointed out
in the Swarb case in which stipulations established that the Phila-
delphia Bar Association Minimum Fee Schedule provides for at-
torney's fees of $150 for filing a petition to open, that the debtor-
petitioner must pay for transcripts of depositions, that the debtor
who stays a sheriff's sale must pay whatever sheriff's costs have
accrued before the stay is effective, and that the unpaid portion of
the debtor's obligation is increased by a 15% to 20% attorney's fee
when execution is filed.
4'
DuE PROCESS
Several writers have suggested the confession of judgment pro-
cedure may be in conflict with the fourteenth amendment due proc-
ess clause.42 The source of the conflict lies in the fact that, without
notice or opportunity for hearing given to the debtor, his property
becomes subject to a judgment lien.43 As noted before, the debtors
in Swarb were not aware of the judgment against them until
they received notice of a sheriff's sale of their property. 44 Since the
entry of judgment by the prothonotary has the same force and ef-
fect as any other judgment of the court,4 5 the court decided that the
lack of notice and opportunity to defend constituted a vital con-
stitutional defect in the Pennsylvania procedure.
The requirements of due process have been a fertile source of
litigation over the years. The Supreme Court of the United States
has stated the requirements of due process:
It never has been doubted by this court, or any other so far
as we know, that notice and hearing are preliminary steps
essential to the passing of an enforceable judgment, and
that they, together with a legally competent tribunal hav-
ing jurisdiction of the case, constitute basic elements of the
40. Hopson, Cognovit Judgments: An Ignored Problem of Due Process
and Full Faith and Credit, 29 U. CH. L. REV. 111, 125 (1961).
41. Swarb v. Lennox, 314 F. Supp. 1091, 1096 (E.D. Pa. 1970).
42. Comment, Abolition of the Confession of Judgment Note in Retail
Installment Sales Contracts in Pennsylvania, 73 DiCm. L. REV. 115 (1968);
Hopson, Cognovit Judgments: An Ignored Problem of Due Process and
Full Faith and Credit, 29 U. Cm. L. REV. 111 (1961); Developments in the
Law-State Court Jurisdiction, 73 HARV. L. REV. 909, 944 (1960).
43. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 739 (1962), as amended, (Supp. 1970).
44. Swarb v. Lennox, 314 F. Supp. 1091, 1096 (E.D. Pa. 1970).
45. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 739 (1962), as amended, (Supp. 1970). See
cases cited note 14 supra.
constitutional requirement of due process of law.46




The courts have not established the precise form of notice to be
given. However, in Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust
Co.,48 the United States Supreme Court held that the fundamental
requirement of due process is notice reasonably calculated to inform
interested parties of the pendency of the action and to give them a
reasonable time to make an appearance.4 9 "The right to be heard
has little reality or worth unless one is informed that the matter is
pending and can choose for himself whether to appear or default,
acquiesce or contest."50  The Supreme Court has taken the posi-
tion that notice must be reasonably calculated to inform of the
pending action in other decisions.51 And, in deciding the constitu-
tionality of a statute, that court has held that notice must be pro-
vided for in the statute and not awarded as a matter of favor. 5 2
In Wuchter v. Pizzutti53 the Supreme Court held a New Jersey
statute providing for service of process on nonresident motorists in-
volved in accidents on its highways must contain a provision making
it reasonably probable that notice of service on the Secretary of
State be communicated to the non-resident defendant. Otherwise,
the defendant would be deprived of property without due process
of law.5 4 Section 73955 does not provide for any notice to be given
to the debtor before entry of judgment against him; the lack of such
provision makes it constitutionally defective.
Although notice must be reasonably calculated to reach in-
terested parties, the form of notice to be given is not necessarily the
same for all persons. In Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank &
Trust Co.,56 the appellant challenged the constitutionality of the
New York Banking Law 57 which provided, on judicial settlement of
accounts by the trustee of a common trust fund, that notice to bene-
ficiaries be given by publication in the newspaper. The United
States Supreme Court held the statutory notice provision did not
46. Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 68 (1932).
47. Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp., 395 U.S. 337 (1969); Arm-
strong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545 (1965); Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank &
Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306 (1950).
48. 339 U.S. 306 (1950).
49. Id. at 314.
50. Id.
51. Schroeder v. City of New York, 371 U.S. 208 (1962); Walker v.
Hutchinson City, 352 U.S. 112 (1956); American Power Co. v. S.E.C., 329
U.S. 90 (1946); Wuchter v. Pizzutti, 276 U.S. 13 (1928).
52. Coe v. Armour Fertilizer Works, 237 U.S. 413 (1915).
53. 276 U.S. 13 (1928).
54. Id.
55. PA. STAT. A.N. tit. 12, § 739 (1962), as amended, (Supp. 1970).
56. 339 U.S. 306 (1950).
57. N.Y. Banking Law § 100-c (McKinney 1950).
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meet the requirements of the fourteenth amendment as applied to
known beneficiaries whose whereabouts are also known; however,
the statutory notice provision was consistent with due process as ap-
plied to unknown beneficiaries. The Court stated that the notice
must be reasonably calculated under all the circumstances to inform
interested parties of the action. Here, the Court found the circum-
stances to be such that notice by publication, although not likely
to reach the unknown beneficiaries, was sufficient to satisfy the due
process standards. The Court declared that the state had a vital in-
terest in providing means to close trusts and bring any issues as to
its fiduciaries to a final settlement and that this interest could be
served only if the interests or claims of those outside the state
could be determined. Further, any construction of the due process
clause which would place impossible or impractical obstacles in the
way could not be justified. The Court said it previously had ap-
proved of resort to publication as a substitute for personal notice
in other cases where it was not reasonably practical or possible to
give more adequate warning, as where the persons were missing or
unknown. Under the circumstances in this case the reasonable
risk that notice might not reach every beneficiary was justifiable.
However, these exceptions in the name of necessity did not sweep
away the rule, and, under the circumstances, as to known benefi-
ciaries, notice provided for in the statute was not reasonably cal-
culated to reach those who could easily have been informed by
other means.
Thus, the interests and duties of the state may be considered
when deciding whether the notice meets the requirements of due
process. 58 It is submitted, however, that no vital state interest is
served by the advantage given to a creditor by the confession of
judgment procedure. It, therefore, provides no excuse for relaxing
the due process requirement of notice. In Sniadach v. Family Fi-
nance Corp.59 the Supreme Court held the Wisconsin prejudgment
garnishment procedure violative of the fourteenth amendment in
that notice and opportunity to be heard were not given.69 The
Court did not consider this a situation requiring special protection
58. Ewing v. Mytinger & Casselberry, Inc., 339 U.S. 594 (1950); Mul-
lane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306 (1950). See
Fahey v. Mallonee, 332 U.S. 245 (1947); Ownbey v. Morgan, 256 U.S. 94
(1921).
59. 395 U.S. 337 (1969).
60. Sniadach dealt with prejudgment garnishment. In Moya v. De-
Baca, 286 F. Supp. 606 (D.N.M. 1968), appeal dismissed, 395 U.S. 825 (1969),
the district court held postjudgment garnishment procedures constitutional
because the judgment debtor had been provided with notice and an oppor-
tunity to be heard in the proceeding that resulted in judgment against him.
to state or creditor interests.
[M] any [industry attorneys] indicate that cognovits are
disliked, are used only because of the competition, and
could be outlawed without basically disrupting the finance
industry. . . . The argument that strong remedies are
needed to induce the finance industry to support the credit
economy is greatly overworked. People borrow money in
non-cognovit states.01
Hearing
Inextricably tied to the due process requirement of notice is
the requirement of an opportunity to be heard. In the confession of
judgment procedure, the first opportunity the debtor has to be
heard occurs when he petitions to strike or to open the judgment.
He usually does not even know that judgment has been confessed
until he is faced with a sheriff's sale or, under the new Rule 2958,
until he receives notice before execution.
2
In Armstrong v. Manzo63 the petitioner sought to have an
adoption decree set aside on the grounds that he had no notice of
the proceedings. Texas law provided that adoption should not be
permitted without the written consent of the child's natural father.
However, if the father had not contributed substantially to the sup-
port of the child during a two year period, written consent of the
judge of juvenile court of the city of the child's residence could be
accepted by the adoption court in lieu of the father's consent. The
child's natural mother filed an affidavit that the petitioner had not
contributed to support for over two years, and the judge issued his
consent to the adoption. On the basis of this consent, the adoption
judge allowed the adoption by the wife's second husband. Peti-
tioner had not received notice of the pendency of the adoption pe-
tition. He was later allowed a hearing on his motion to set aside
the decree, but his motion was denied.
The United States Supreme Court was faced not only with the
question of whether the lack of notice deprived the petitioner of due
process but also with the question whether the subsequent hearing
on his motion cured the constitutional defect.6 4 After finding that
due process requires notice reasonably calculated to apprise in-
terested parties of the pendency of the action and to afford them
an opportunity to present their objections, the Court held the sub-
sequent hearings did not cure the constitutional defect. It stated
that had notice been given to petitioner, those seeking the adoption
would have had the burden of proving why the petitioner's consent
was not required. Instead, petitioner in the subsequent hearing on
61. Hopson, Cognovit Judgments: An Ignored Problem of Due Proc-
ess and Full Fiath and Credit, 29 U. CHi. L. REV. 111, 139 (1961).
62. PA. R. Civ. P. 2958.
63. 380 U.S. 545 (1965).
64. Id. at 550.
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his motion was faced with the burden of affirmatively showing he
had contributed to the support of his child. According to the
Court, the burden on the petitioner was real since where the burden
of proof lies may be decisive of the outcome.
6 5
It is submitted an analogous situation exists in the confession
of judgment procedure. The debtor, after judgment has been en-
tered against him, will be afforded a hearing only if he petitions to
have the judgment opened or stricken. The debtor will then have
to affirmatively prove any defenses, 66 such as lack of authority in
the one confessing judgment to do so.
The courts have also held that the opportunity to be heard
must be granted in a meaningful time and in a meaningful man-
ner.867 Rule 2958 provides for a 20 day notice before execution on
the judgment. Failure to notify the debtor, however, does not af-
fect the lien of the judgment which has been entered without no-
tice to the debtor; it merely delays the execution. 68  And, as the
court in the Swarb case astutely noted:
We do not believe that the 20-day notice provision prior to
execution of a confessed judgment under Pennsylvania
Procedural Rule 2958(b), as recently revised, grants suffi-
cient time to permit a debtor with limited resources to se-
cure an attorney to undertake the above-described proce-
dures for opening or striking off a confessed judgment.69
Waiver of Notice
As stated in Swarb, the procedure for confession of judgment
65. Id. at 551.
66. See notes 18, 19 supra.
67. See cases cited note 51 supra.
68. PA. R. Civ. P. 2958:
Execution. Notice of Entry of Judgment
(a) Within twenty (20) days after the entry of judgment the
plaintiff shall mail to the defendant, by ordinary mail addressed
to the defendant at his last known address, written notice of the
entry setting forth the date, the court, term and number and the
amount of the judgment, and file with the prothonotary an affidavit
of mailing of the notice. Failure to mail the notice and file the
affidavit shall not affect the lien of the judgment.
(b) Within twenty (20) days after the entry of judgment the
plaintiff may issue a writ of execution even if the notice has not
yet been mailed and the affidavit of mailing has not yet been
filed. The lien of any levy or attachment made pursuant to such a
writ within or after the twenty (20) day period shall be valid.
However no further proceedings may be had pursuant to such writ
until twenty (20) days after the notice has been mailed and the
affidavit of mailing has been filed.
(c) If no affidavit has been filed within the twenty (20) day
period after the entry of judgment, no writ of execution may be
issued thereafter until twenty (20) days after the affidavit of
mailing has been filed.
69. 314 F. Supp. 1091, 1101 (E.D. Pa. 1970).
is based on the concept of a waiver of notice by the debtor. 0 Par-
ties may agree by contract to waive notice.71 However, the United
States Supreme Court has said that there must be every reasonable
presumption against the waiver of fundamental constitutional
rights, 72 the courts do not presume acquiescence in the loss of a
fundamental right.
7 3
Waiver has been defined as "ordinarily an intentional relin-
quishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege. ' 74 Many
courts have taken the position that a constitutional right is not
waived unless the consent to waive is voluntarily, intentionally
given.73 Thus, the Swarb court examined the evidence to deter-
mine whether the consent to waive notice was intentionally given
by the debtors who signed confession of judgment notes. It found
the debtors did not understand the legal effect of the contracts they
had signed. That the debtor is unaware of the extent to which he
is contracting away his constitutional rights is supported by many
writers. 76 And, it follows that if the contracting party does not un-
derstand he has waived his rights, he cannot have done so inten-
tionally. Since the Pennsylvania procedure allows a waiver with-
out the understanding consent of the debtor, it violates the due
process clause of the fourteenth amendment. 77
Presumably, if the confession of judgment procedure provided
that the creditor must show a voluntary consent to the waiver of
notice by the debtor, it would be constitutional. It is submitted that
although this may put a proof burden on the creditor, the added
burden is justified. If there is no provision for such showing in the
statute itself, the lack of voluntary consent to waiver would be
merely an additional defense for the debtor in his petition to open
the judgment. Thus, the evils of the procedure and the harshness,
particularly as applied to low income consumers, which the courts
have sought to relieve would remain. Judgment could still be en-
tered under the statutory procedure, thereby requiring the debtor
to get an attorney and sustain his burden of proof in his petition to
open based on his lack of voluntary consent.
70. Id. at 1100.
71. National Equipment Rental Ltd. v. Szukhent, 375 U.S. 311 (1964).
72. Brookhart v. Janis, 384 U.S. 1 (1966); Glasser v. United States,
315 U.S. 60 (1941); Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938).
73. Ohio Bell Tel. Co. v. Public Util. Comm'n., 301 U.S. 292, 307 (1937).
74. Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938) [emphasis added].
75. See Massey v. Moore, 348 U.S. 105 (1954); Johnson v. Zerbst, 304
U.S. 458 (1938); Walker v. Peppersack, 316 F.2d 119 (4th Cir. 1963); Com-
monwealth v. Cavel, 244 F. Supp. 560 (M.D. Pa. 1965).
76. Comment, Abolition of the Confession of Judgment Note in Retail
Installment Sales Contracts in Pennsylvania, 73 DICK. L. REv. 115, 116
(1968). See Comment, Translating Sympathy for Deceived Consumers into
Effective Programs for Protection, 114 U. PA. L. Rrv. 395, 418 (1966);
Leary, Random Reflections on Remedies and Collections in the Consumer
Credit Field, 19 AM. U. L. REV. 189, 199 (1970).




The Eastern District Court in Swarb limited its decision by
declaring the Pennsylvania statutes and rules unconstitutional only
as applied to leases and consumer financing documents signed by
Pennsylvania residents earning less than $10,000 per year. It stated
that, according to a study of 245 Philadelphia debtors in default,
only 4% of the debtors had incomes over $10,000 and found that the
interests of these 4% were not adequately represented by the
debtors who brought this action. 78 It also stated that the evidence
did not support a finding of lack of understanding consent in bonds
and warrants of attorney accompanying mortgages.
79
As a general proposition, a court should never formulate a rule
of constitutional law broader than is required by the precise facts to
which it is to be applied.8 0 Thus, one to whom the application of
the statute is constitutional cannot attack it on the ground that it
may be unconstitutional as applied to other persons. 8' In United
States v. Raines8 2 the United States Supreme Court pointed out the
reason for the rule: it is undesirable for the court to consider
every conceivable situation which might arise in the application of
complex, comprehensive situations.8 3  However, the Court contin-
ued:
And the rule's rationale may disappear where the statute in
question has already been declared unconstitutional in the
vast majority of its intended applications, and it can fairly
be said that it was not intended to stand as valid, on the
basis of fortuitous circumstances, only in a fraction of the
cases it was originally designed to cover.
8 4
Admittedly, the confession of judgment procedure is harshest
as applied to the low income consumer, and it is against this class
that it is most often used. The low income consumer is less suscep-
tible to a creditor's interim collection methods and is, therefore,
more likely to be subject to the legal process.8 5 However, if the
Pennsylvania procedure is unconstitutional as applied to 96%8
78. Id. at 1097.
79. Id. at 1098.
80. United States v. Raines, 362 U.S. 17 (1960); Steamship Co. v.
Emigration Comm'rs., 113 U.S. 33 (1885).
81. United States v. Raines, 362 U.S. 17 (1960); Barrows v. Jackson,
346 U.S. 249 (1953); Booz v. Reed, 398 Pa. 172, 157 A.2d 170 (1960).
82. 362 U.S. 17 (1960).
83. Id. at 21.
84. Id. at 23.
85. Note, Resort to the Legal Process in Collecting Debts from High
Risk Credit Buyers in Los Angeles-Alternative Methods for Allocating
Present Costs, 14 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 879, 895 (1967).
86. Swarb v. Lennox, 314 F. Supp. 1091, 1097 (E.D. Pa. 1970).
(certainly a vast majority) of the consumer-judgment debtors, the
rationale of the rule fails, and the constitutional ruling need not be
limited to the precise facts at hand.
The plaintiff-debtors in Swarb had standing to attack the va-
lidity of the law since their rights were directly affected by it.8
7
The question then became whether they could adequately repre-
sent all judgment debtors. The Swarb court decided that the judg-
ment debtors in this action could not fairly and adequately repre-
sent the interests of those earning $10,000 or more.8 8
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provide:
One or more members of a class may sue or be sued as rep-
resentative parties on behalf of all only if . . . (4) the rep-
resentative parties will fairly and adequately protect the in-
terests of the class.
8 9
The Swarb court decided the debtors in this action did not ade-
quately represent the interests of all judgment debtors regardless of
income.
The issue here, however, was whether the confession of judg-
ment procedure deprives a debtor of due process of law because it
does not provide for notice and hearing before entry of judgment.
The court based its decision on the lack of adequate understanding
of the debtors in waiving these fundamental rights. It is sub-
mitted that the class involved here was all debtors who have signed
confession of judgment notes, and the class did not have to be
limited to those earning less than $10,000 per year.
The Federal Rules also provide:
An action may be maintained as a class action if the pre-
requisites of subdivision (a) are satisfied, and in addition:
(3) the court finds that the questions of law or fact pre-
dominate over any questions affecting only individual
members, and that a class action is superior to other avail-
able methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the
controversy. 0
The fundamental constitutional issues were raised on behalf of all
judgment debtors. It cannot be assumed that those earning over
$10,000 per year would be severely hampered in their efforts to
secure credit because the creditor is constitutionally unable to uti-
lize the confession of judgment procedure.9 1 Any adverse effect is
outweighed by the necessity of securing for them their constitu-
tional right to due process of law. It cannot be assumed that those
earning $10,000 understand the effect of the confession of judgment
87. See Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U.S. 249 (1953); Buchanan v. War-
ley, 245 U.S. 60 (1917); Smith v. Board of Education, 365 F.2d 770 (8th Cir.
1966).
88. Swarb v. Lennox, 314 F. Supp. 1091, 1097 (E.D. Pa. 1970).
89. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(a).
90. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b) [emphasis added].
91. See Hopson, Cognovit Judgments: An Ignored Problem of Due
Process and Full Faith and Credit, 29 U. C i. L. Rsv. 111 (1961).
Recent Case
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clause any more than those earning under $10,000. The Swarb court
pointed out that it could not dictate what constitutes understand-
ing waiver of notice,92 but it is submitted that a man's economic
status is not the standard of proof of such understanding. In
Smith v. Board of Education,93 the Circuit Court of Appeals for the
Eighth Circuit stated:
[I]n order to have standing to litigate a constitutional ques-
tion, one must be asserting the right in his own behalf ...
But this 'is only a rule of practice' which may be 'out-
weighed by need to protect' . . . fundamental rights; that
need in turn will prompt courts on grounds of broad con-
stitutional policy to proceed without blind adherence to
technical rules of representation .
4
Statutory Classification
A legislature may enact a statute which sets up different classes
of citizens to which it will apply.9 5 While the Constitution does not
require that all persons be dealt with identically, due process and
equal protection of the laws do require that the classification
have some relevance to the purpose for which it was made and that
it not be patently arbitrary. 96
It is submitted that the court in Swarb engrafted onto the
Pennsylvania confession of judgment statutes a classification which
has no real relevance to the purpose for which it was made. Since
the class involved here was debtors against whom judgment had
been confessed pursuant to an unconstitutional procedure and since
the debtors could adequately represent the issue of the constitu-
tionality of the procedure as applied to all members of that class,
the economic classification imposed on the statute was arbitrary
and unreasonable.
The Eastern District Court has taken a position previously
urged by legal writers in declaring the confession of judgment pro-
cedure unconstitutional. However, its decision is questionable in
its limitation to a specified class of debtors. The rationale of the
decision applies to all debtors; a debtor's income should not deter-
mine his constitutional rights.
HOLLY E. MOEHLMANN
92. Swarb v. Lennox, 314 F. Supp. 1091, 1100-01 (E.D. Pa. 1970).
93. 365 F.2d 770 (8th Cir. 1966).
94. Id. at 776.
95. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969); Baxstrom v. Herold,
383 U.S. 107 (1966); Fleming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603 (1960); Morey v. Doud,
354 U.S. 457 (1957); Clark v. Paul Gray, Inc., 306 U.S. 583 (1939); Bayside
Fish Flour Co. v. Gentry, 297 U.S. 422 (1936); District of Columbia v.
Brooke, 214 U.S. 138 (1908).
96. Cases cited note 95 supra.
The Penalty of Indifference
mm-
The lawyer who is indifferent to the need of keeping
fully informed regarding cases and statutes on which
he proposes to rely is very likely to be penalized by
embarrassment and loss of prestige.
Under present conditions no one can compete success-
fully who overlooks the most efficient and economical
way of keeping up to date and getting things done.
This is why Shepard's Citations is particularly impor-
tant now. If not only increases speed, cuts costs and
insures accuracy but it also brings every other legal
publication up to date.
Subscribers know from experience that the small cost
involved is offset many times by the benefits they re-
ceive from the service. They also know that with Shep-
ard's Citations at their disposal they are not likely to
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